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Abstract   
The titular question here “Why is There A World AT ALL, Rather Than Just Nothing?” is a fusion 
of two successive queries posed by Leibniz in 1697 and 1714. He did so to lay the groundwork for 
his explanatory theistic answer. But the present paper offers (i) A very unfavorable verdict from my 
critical scrutiny of the explanatory demand made by Leibniz, and (ii) My argument for the complete 
failure of his interrogative ontological challenge as a springboard for his and Richard Swinburne’s 
creationist theistic answer. I argue under (i) that Leibniz’s explanatory demand is an ill-conceived 
non-starter which poses a pseudo issue. Thus, his and Swinburne’s case for divine creation miscarries 
altogether. My collateral conclusion: The philosophical enterprise need not be burdened at all by 
Leibniz’s ontological query, because it is just a will-o’-the-wisp.  
Key words: Leibniz, Failed Primordial Existential Question, Pseudo-Issue, Cosmological Argument..
 
Resumen. ¿Por qué hay mundo, en lugar de nada? 
La pregunta “¿Por qué hay un mundo, en lugar de nada?” Es una fusión de dos preguntas sucesivas 
planteadas en 1697 y 1714 por Leibniz para sentar las bases de su explicación. El presente documento 
ofrece (i) un veredicto muy desfavorable de mi examen crítico de los motivos de la reivindicación 
formulada por Leibniz, y (ii) mi argumentación del fracaso total de su desafío ontológico interrogativo 
como trampolín para su respuesta teísta, y la creacionista de Richard Swinburne. Yo sostengo en (i) 
que la demanda de motivos de Leibniz es una idea imposible abocada al fracaso que plantea un 
pseudo tema. Por lo tanto, su caso y el de Swinburne abortan completamente la tesis de creación 
divina. Mi conclusión colateral: La empresa filosófica no tiene que cargar con la pregunta ontológica 
de Leibniz, ya que es sólo una mala concepción. 
Palabras clave: Leibniz, error primordial, pregunta existencial, pseudo-cuestión; argumento 
cosmológico.
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1.  Introduction
In his 1697 article “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
posed a historic question: He asked for “a full reason why there should be any world rather 
than none” [italics added] (1697/1973, p. 136). In a sequel of 1714, he famously asked 
more generally: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” [italics in original] (1714/1973, 
sec. 7, p. 199). And he construed this question more specifically as “why is there something 
contingent, rather than nothing contingent?” Thus, presumably, Leibniz’s two successive 
interrogative formulations of 1697 and 1714 can legitimately coalesce into the titular 
question here: “Why is there a World at all, rather than just nothing?”  
 In earlier writings (2004, p. 563; 2008b, p. 6), I introduced the locution “the Primordial 
Existential Question” to denote Leibniz’s more familiar 1714 formulation “Why is there 
something, rather than nothing?” And there, I used the acronym “PEQ” to abbreviate 
the phrase “the Primordial Existential Question.” Yet here, I shall extend the designation 
“PEQ” to refer alternatively to Leibniz’s somewhat more specific 1697 query: Why should 
there be any world rather than none?
 In this interrogative sentence, his term “none,” as applied to worlds, can best be taken 
to be an ellipsis for the putative special sort of world containing nothing contingent, the 
so-called “Null World.” And then his term “any world” can be taken to be elliptical for “any 
world containing something contingent or other.” With these understandings, the titular 
question of this paper is elliptical for asking “Why is there any world containing something 
contingent or other, rather than the null world.”
 In this Leibnizian context, it would be a serious exegetical mistake to object that the 
explanatory demand made by his PEQ simply begs the question self-stultifyingly. The 
charge would be that any premise which might serve to explain the existence of something, 
such as our universe, would itself have to presuppose just such an existent on pain of vicious 
circularity. But, in effect, Leibniz parried this complaint of petitio principii by pointing out 
in his 1714 paper that although no contingent agency could provide a non-circular answer 
to PEQ, a necessarily existing one could. Thus, he argued there: “Now this sufficient reason 
of [i.e., for] the existence of the universe…, which needs no further reason, must be outside 
this series of contingent things, and must lie in a substance which is the cause of this series, 
or which is a necessary being, bearing the reason of its existence within itself; …” [italics 
added] (Leibniz, 1714/1973, sec. 8).  In short, for Leibniz, the agency of a necessarily 
existing divine being provides a non-circular answer to a properly construed, articulated 
version of PEQ.
 Unlike Leibniz, the present-day philosopher Richard Swinburne claims that God exists 
only contingently. Hence, Swinburne believes that God is also absent from a world which 
is devoid of all contingent entities. 
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 Like the philosopher Derek Parfit, I shall speak of the presumed logical possibility of 
there being nothing contingent as “The Null Possibility.” And like him, I use the label 
“Null World” to refer to a hypothetical world in which there is nothing contingent at all.
 My major concern here will be, in due course, to provide a thorough critical scrutiny of 
Leibniz’s time-honored PEQ, which will culminate in the complete deflation of PEQ. But to 
lay the groundwork for this line of argument, several preliminary admonitions will occupy 
us beforehand.
2.  Is it imperative to explain why the Null Possibility is not instantiated?
First I need to comment on the gloss or twist that Parfit and Swinburne have put upon 
Leibniz’s PEQ. Almost a decade ago, Parfit wrote
[W]hy is there a Universe at all? It might have been true that nothing [contingent] ever 
existed; no living beings, no stars, no atoms, not even space or time. When we think 
about this [“Null”] possibility (1998a, p. 420), it can seem astonishing that anything 
[contingent] exists [bolding added] (1998b, p. 24).
 Thereupon, Parfit enthrones PEQ on a pedestal, saying: “No question is more sublime 
than why there is a Universe [i.e., some world or other]: why there is anything rather than 
nothing” (ibid., column 1). Importantly, Parfit’s logical motivation for this cosmic version 
of PEQ derives largely from the insidious peremptory assumption that the actual existence 
of a contingent universe in lieu of the Null World is not to be expected, and that the de facto 
existence of our world is therefore inescapably amazing and perplexing!
 Swinburne shares Parfit’s astonishment that anything at all exists, declaring: “It remains 
to me, as to so many who have thought about the matter, a source of extreme puzzlement 
that there should exist anything at all” (Swinburne, 1991, p. 283). And, more recently, 
Swinburne opined: “It is extraordinary that there should exist anything at all. Surely the 
most natural state of affairs is simply nothing: no universe, no God, nothing” [italics added] 
(Swinburne, 1996, p. 48) Evidently, Swinburne’s avowed “extreme puzzlement” [my italics] 
that anything contingent exists at all is driven by the same peremptory mind-set as Parfit’s 
astonishment.
 The late Paul Edwards, in a 1967 article “Why?” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
chronicled some of the long history of PEQ and of its cognates (Edwards, 1967, pp. 296-
301). In 1999, this saga culminated in a tome of over 750 pages by the Swiss philosopher 
Ludger Lütkehaus, published in German, whose fetching title in English is Nothing: 
Farewell to Being, End of Anxiety. Suffice it just to mention that Lütkehaus deplores the so-
called onto-centricity of our culture, the purported paranoid nihilophobia of our supposed 
ontological greed, and the like.
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 Turning to Parfit, I challenge his declared astonishment that anything contingent exists 
at all by asking him: Why should the mere contemplation of the Null Possibility reasonably 
make it “seem astonishing that anything exists” as he claims? I contend that it should not 
do so. Let me point out why it should indeed not.
 If some of us were to consider the logical possibility that a person we see might 
conceivably metamorphose spontaneously into an elephant, for example, I doubt strongly 
that we would feel even the slightest temptation to ask why that mere logical possibility is 
not realized. Why then, I ask Parfit, should anyone reasonably feel astonished at all that 
the Null Possibility, if genuine, has remained a mere unrealized logical possibility, and that 
something does exist instead? In short, why should there be just nothing, merely because it is 
logically possible? This mere logical possibility of the Null World, I claim, does not suffice 
to legitimate Parfit’s demand for an explanation of why the Null World does not obtain, 
an explanation he seeks as a philosophical anodyne for his misguided astonishment that 
anything at all exists.
3.  Christian doctrine as an inspiration of PEQ
It now behooves me to explicate the implicit and explicit presuppositions of Leibniz’s PEQ. 
This articulation is vital for a fundamental reason: If one or more of these presuppositions 
of PEQ is either ill-founded or presumably false, then PEQ is aborted as a non-starter, 
because it would be posing an ill-conceived issue or a pseudo-problem. And, in that case, 
the very existence of something contingent, instead of nothing contingent, does not 
require explanation. For example, if a Mr. X presumably never committed a murder, it 
is ill-conceived to ask him just when he did it, and it is fatuous to blame him for not 
answering this question.
 In earlier writings (Grünbaum, 1998, p. 16; 2000, pp. 5, 19), I have used the rather 
pejorative term “pseudo-problem” to reject “a question that rests on an ill-founded 
or demonstrably false presupposition” (2000, p. 19). But, since the German term 
“Scheinproblem” for “pseudo-problem” was given currency by the Vienna Circle, I now 
reiterate my caveat that, in my own use of that label to denote an ill-conceived question, “I 
definitely do not intend to hark back to early positivist indictments of ‘meaninglessness’” 
(ibid.). 
 Yet the notion that a question is ill-conceived or a non-starter, because it rests on 
substantive quicksand, surely ante-dates the logical positivist disparagement of certain 
traditional philosophical problems as pseudo-questions. Thus, in medieval debates, some 
issues were dismissed as clearly unproblematic under the Latin rubric of cadit quaestio. 
Despite this venerable ancestry, the 20th century challenge from the Vienna Circle was 
timely after all, I believe, because sometimes a seemingly well-conceived, plausible 
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question may not be warranted after all. Thus, a question may be misguided, because it is 
inappropriately generated by an assumption that was previously unrecognized to be very 
misleading indeed.
 One of the main tasks that I have set for myself here is to show precisely how Leibniz’s 
PEQ is vitiated by implicitly presupposing an altogether dubious corollary of an old 
Christian doctrine. Elsewhere (Grünbaum, 2004, pp. 561, 571), I have formulated 
that unacceptable corollary as follows: Spontaneously, the world should feature nothing 
contingent at all, and indeed there would be nothing contingent in the absence of an 
overriding external cause (or reason), a null state of affairs which is ontologically the “most 
natural” of all!
 For brevity, I say that this tribute to the Null World asserts “the ontological spontaneity 
of nothingness” (Grünbaum, 2000, p. 5). And I have introduced the acronym “SoN” to 
designate the doctrine which avows this ontological spontaneity of the Null World. In 
this acronym, the “S” stands for “Spontaneity,” the “o” for “of,” and the “N” for the word 
“Nothingness.” And my reason for having articulated SoN is precisely that its claim will 
turn out to be a completely unwarranted presupposition of PEQ. Bear in mind that, in 
a nutshell, SoN is the thesis that a null state of affairs is categorically the most natural or 
normal.
 The traditional Christian doctrine which unilaterally entails SoN as a corollary makes 
the following avowal axiomatically: The very existence of any and every contingent entity, 
apart from God himself, is utterly dependent on God at any and all times. Clearly, this tenet 
of total ontological dependency yields SoN as an immediate corollary, because SoN tells 
us that, in the absence of an external supernatural cause, the ontologically spontaneous, 
natural or normal state of affairs is one in which nothing contingent exists at all.
 A further corollary of the Christian dependency axiom is that, without constant divine 
creative support —“so-called” perpetual creation— the world would instantly lapse into 
nothingness, as claimed by Aquinas, Descartes and many others.
 Thus, according to SoN, the actual existence of something contingent or other is a 
deviation from the supposedly spontaneous and natural state of nothingness. And, qua 
such a deviation, contingently existing objects would clearly require a creative external cause 
ex nihilo, a so-called ratio essendi, a reason for existing at all.
 Yet, such a supposed creative cause must be distinguished, as Aquinas rightly emphasized, 
from a merely transformative cause: Transformative causes, which are familiar from science 
and daily life, produce changes of state in contingent things that already exist in some form.
 Furthermore, according to the traditional Christian commitment to SoN, creation ex 
nihilo is required anew at every instant at which the world exists, even if it has existed forever. 
Therefore, traditional Christian theism makes a major claim as follows: If any contingent 
entity exists, but does so without having a transformative cause, then its existence must have 
a creative cause ex nihilo, rather than being externally UNCAUSED.
Adolf  GrünbaumOntology Studies 9, 2009 12
 However, very importantly, SoN can be strongly challenged ontologically by confronting 
it with the counter-question: “But why should there be nothing contingent, rather than 
something contingent?” And, indeed, why would there be just nothing contingent, rather 
than something contingent? Moreover, why would there be nothing contingent in the 
absence of an overriding external cause?
 Unfortunately, in the Christian culture of the Occident, both philosophers and 
ordinary people have inveterately imbibed SoN with their mother’s milk. And it is deeply 
ingrained even among a good many of those who altogether reject its received theological 
underpinning. But before Christianity molded the philosophical intuitions of our culture, 
neither Greek philosophy nor most other world cultures featured SoN (Eliade, 1992). No 
wonder that Aristotle regarded the material universe as both uncreated and eternal.
 Yet, as we shall see, to Leibniz’s credit, when he espoused SoN, he tried to give a 
legitimating ontological argument to support it as part of a two-fold a priori justification of 
his PEQ. I shall soon contend, however, that his valiant effort miscarries altogether.
 In 1935, the French philosopher Henri Bergson aptly, though incompletely, sketched 
SoN, when he rightly deplored its beguiling role in the misguided posing of PEQ. As 
Bergson put it:
. . . [P]art of metaphysics moves, consciously or not, around the question of knowing 
why anything exists – why matter, or spirit, or God, rather than nothing at all? But the 
question presupposes that reality fills a void, that underneath Being lies nothingness, that 
de jure there should be nothing, that we must therefore explain why there is de facto 
something [bolding added] (Bergson, 1974, pp. 239-240).
How then have the defenders of SoN tried to justify it in its own right, rather than just 
as a logically weaker corollary of the aforestated Christian dogma of the world’s total 
ontological dependence on the Deity?
4.  A priori justifications of SoN by Leibniz, Swinburne and others
Some philosophers, notably Leibniz Leibniz and Richard Swinburne, have appealed to 
the presumed a priori simplicity of the Null World to argue that de jure there should be 
nothing contingent, so that the de facto existence of our world would make an answer to 
PEQ imperative. However, as I shall contend, the recourse to simplicity to defend SoN a 
priori is very unsuccessful, and moreover, significantly, there is no empirical support for 
SoN either. Therefore, this two-fold ill-foundedness of SoN will undermine PEQ precisely 
because PEQ presupposes SoN.
 To mount an a priori defense of SoN, Leibniz and Swinburne maintained that the Null 
World is simpler, both ontologically and conceptually, than a world containing something 
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contingent or other. As Leibniz put it in 1714 “For ‘nothing’ [the Null World] is simpler 
and easier than ‘something’ ” (1714/1973, sec. 7, p. 199). This dual assertion of greater 
simplicity poses a fundamental question: Even assuming that the Null World is thus doubly 
simpler than any contingent something, does its supposed maximum dual simplicity 
mandate ontologically that there should be just nothing de jure, and that, furthermore, there 
would be just nothing in the absence of an overriding cause (reason), as claimed by SoN? 
My answer is emphatically negative. 
 I contend that the supposed a priori simplicity of the Null World is not ontologically 
legislative (Grünbaum, 2004, p. 573; 2008b, p. 11), because such simplicity would not 
mandate the claim of SoN that de jure the thus simplest world must be spontaneously 
realized ontologically by the Null World in the absence of an overriding cause! After all, 
having the simplest ontological constitution, which is presumably a feature of the Null 
World, does not itself make for the actualization or instantiation of the world featuring that 
constitution. Yet neither Leibniz nor his followers (e.g. Richard Swinburne) have offered 
any cogent reason at all to posit such an ontological imperative (Grünbaum, 2008a).
5. Are the philosophical fortunes of Occam’s Razor helpful?
Nor can SoN be vindicated ontologically by recourse to the kind of simplicity demanded 
by Occam’s Razor in the 14th century, the so-called “Principle of Parsimony.” For, as John 
Stuart Mill rightly emphasized, the Occamite demand for parsimony is a methodological 
rule requiring that we have evidence for our beliefs. Occam’s injunction is not—as William 
Hamilton claimed in the 19th century—an ontological truth avowing that the world has 
a simple constitution. Nor does Occam’s Razor license Jack Smart’s hope that “simple 
theories are objectively more likely to be true than are complex ones” (Smart, 1984).
 After all, the ancient Greek Thales’ monistic hydrochemistry of the chemical universality 
of water is overwhelmingly simpler than Mendeleyev’s 19th century polychemistry, yet 
the Russian’s polychemistry is enormously more likely to be true. Similarly, the ordinary 
second-order differential equations in Newton’s inverse square law of universal gravitation 
are clearly far simpler than the awesomely complex non-linear partial differential field 
equations in Einstein’s theory of gravitation. Yet, we may presume that Einstein’s theory is 
more likely to be true (Grünbaum, 2008a).
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6.  The demise of Leibniz’s 1714 justification for PEQ
Now, let us come to grips with the specific 1714 context in which Leibniz formulated 
his PEQ, and then tried to justify it at once, by relying carefully on both of the following 
two premises: (1) His well-known Principle of Sufficient Reason, to which I shall refer 
by the acronym “PSR,” and (2) his aforestated a priori argument from simplicity for the 
presupposition SoN, a presupposition which is implicit in PEQ’s contrasting clause “rather 
than nothing” (Leibniz, 1714/1973, secs. 7 and 8). Leibniz declared:
. . . the great principle of sufficient reason  [PSR] . . . holds that nothing takes place 
without sufficient reason, that is . . . a reason sufficient to determine why it is thus and 
not otherwise. This principle having been laid down, the first question we are entitled 
to ask will be: Why is there something [contingent] rather than nothing [contingent]? 
For “nothing” [i.e., the Null World] is simpler and easier than “something.” [italics in 
original] (Leibniz, 1714/1973, sec. 7, p. 199).
These avowals by Leibniz invite the following set of comments: 
1.  Right after enunciating his Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), he poses PEQ “Why is 
there something rather than nothing?” as “the first question we are entitled to ask.” Precisely 
by containing the contrasting clause “rather than nothing,” PEQ implicitly avows SoN. 
However, immediately after thus raising PEQ, Leibniz relies on the supposed simplicity 
of the Null World to justify PEQ’s presupposition SoN, claiming, in effect, that the Null 
World would be spontaneously realized ontologically in the absence of an overriding 
external cause. As he puts it concisely: “For ‘nothing’ [i.e., the Null World] is simpler 
and easier than ‘something’ ” [bolding added]. And clearly, there is either something or 
nothing.
2. To justify his PEQ, Leibniz is evidently concerned to motivate not only its first 
component “Why is there something?” but also its further contrasting interrogative 
clause “rather than nothing.” But decidedly, the point of this contrasting clause is not to 
express the tautology that there is either something or nothing. Instead, the contrasting 
clause is an ampliative major addition to the first clause in Charles S. Peirce’s sense; 
it is a crucial extension of the first clause by serving Leibniz to assert SoN. In short, 
PSR by itself would have justified only the truncated question “Why is there something 
contingent?” without warranting PEQ’s further contrasting clause as a vital ampliative 
addendum to it. 
    Thus Leibniz is evidently not content to rely on his PSR alone to ask merely 
the truncated question “Why is there something contingent?” without the extending 
contrasting clause “rather than nothing.” Instead, in effect, he uses SoN as presupposed 
in this contrasting clause to assert a dual thesis: (i) the existence of something contingent 
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is not to be expected at all, and (ii) its actual existence therefore cries out for causal 
explanation. As will be recalled, just this dual thesis was Parfit’s rationale for embracing 
Leibniz’s PEQ.
In sum, the soundness of Leibniz’s justification of his PEQ evidently turns on the cogency 
of his PSR as well as of his a priori argument from simplicity for SoN. But we have already 
discounted his a priori argument for SoN in Section 4. Thus, we can concentrate on 
appraising his Principle of Sufficient Reason.
 Consider within our universe, the grounds for the demise in 20th century quantum 
theory of the universal causation familiar from Newton’s physics, as codified by Laplace’s 
“determinism.” This empirically well-founded quantum theory features merely probabilistic 
rather than universal causal laws governing such phenomena as the spontaneous radioactive 
disintegration of atomic nuclei, yielding emissions of alpha or beta particles, and/or gamma 
rays.
 In this domain of phenomena, there are physically possible particular events that 
could but do not actually occur at given times under specified initial conditions. Yet it is 
impermissibly legislative ontologically to insist that merely because these unrealized events 
are thus physically possible, there must be an explanation entailing their specific non-
occurrence, and similarly, a deductive explanation of probabilistically governed actually 
occurring events, as demanded by Leibniz’s PSR.
 This admonition against PSR was not heeded by Swinburne, who avowed entitlement 
to pan-explainability, declaring: “We expect all things to have explanations” (1991, p. 287). 
In just this vein Leibniz had demanded, for every event, an explanatory “reason [cause] 
sufficient to determine why it is thus and not otherwise” [bolding added]. Hence the 
history of modern quantum physics teaches that PSR, which Leibniz avowedly saw as 
metaphysical, cannot be warranted a priori and indeed is untenable on empirical grounds.
 Thus, to discover that the universe does not accommodate rigid prescriptions for 
deterministic explanatory understanding is not tantamount to scientific failure; instead, it 
is to discover positive reasons for identifying certain coveted explanations as phantom.
 As we saw, Leibniz had generated PEQ by conjoining his PSR with SoN. Yet since his 
a priori defense of SoN via simplicity has failed, it remains to inquire whether his avowed 
ontological spontaneity of the Null World might possibly be warranted empirically. My 
answer is emphatically negative for the following reason: It turns out, as an induction from 
various episodes in the history of science, that SoN is altogether ill-founded empirically.
 To examine the empirical status of SoN, it will be useful to reformulate it in Richard 
Swinburne’s aforecited words as follows: “Surely the most natural state of affairs is simply 
nothing: no universe, no God, nothing” [italics added]. But since our empirical evidence 
comes, of course, from our own universe U, consider the corollary of SoN which pertains 
to our U. This corollary asserts that it is natural or spontaneous for U not to exist, rather than 
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to exist. As against any a priori dictum on what is the “natural” ontological behavior of U, 
the verdict on that behavior will now be seen to depend crucially on empirical evidence, and 
indeed to provide no empirical support for SoN at all.
 Two specific cosmological examples spell this empirical moral:
1.  The first example is furnished by the natural evolution of one of the big bang models 
of the universe countenanced by general relativistic cosmology, the dust-filled so-
called “Friedmann universe.” This universe has the following features (Wald, 1984, 
pp. 100-101):
(a) It is a spatially closed, 3-dimensional spherical universe (a “3- sphere”), 
which  expands from a point-like big bang to a maximum finite size, and 
then contracts into a point-like crunch,
(b) That universe exists altogether for only a finite span of time, such that no 
instants of time existed prior to its finite duration or exists afterward,
(c) As a matter of natural law, its total rest-mass is conserved for the entire 
time-period of its existence, so that, during that entire time, there is no need 
for a supernatural agency to generate it ex nihilo and/or to prevent it from 
lapsing into nothingness, contrary to SoN and to Aquinas and Descartes.
  Evidently, the “natural” dynamical evolution of the Friedmann big 
bang  universe as a whole is specified by Einstein’s empirically supported 
cosmology. Thus, the “natural” or spontaneous ontological behavior of 
big bang worlds is not vouchsafed a priori.
2. The same epistemic moral concerning the empirical status of cosmological naturalness 
is spelled by the illuminating case of the now largely defunct Bondi and Gold so-
called  steady-state cosmology of 1948 (Bondi, 1960).
 Their 1948 steady-state theory features a spatially and temporally infinite universe 
in which the following cosmological principle holds: As a matter of natural law, 
there is large-scale conservation of matter-density. Note that this conservation is 
not of matter, but of the density of matter over time. The conjunction of this 
constancy of the density with Hubble’s mutual recession of the galaxies from one 
another then entails a counter-intuitive consequence: Throughout space-time, and 
without any matter-generating agency, new matter (in the form of hydrogen) pops into 
existence completely naturally in violation of matter-energy conservation.
Hence the Bondi and Gold world features the accretion or formation of new matter as its 
natural, normal, spontaneous behavior, yet terrestrially at a very slow rate. And although 
this accretive formation is indeed out of nothing, it is clearly not “creation” by an external 
agency. Apparently, if the steady-state world were actual, it would discredit the doctrine of 
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the medieval Latin epigram “Ex nihilo, nihil fit,” which means “from nothing, you cannot 
get anything,” or more familiarly, “you cannot get blood out of a stone.”
 The steady-state theory owes its demise to the failure of its predictions and retrodictions 
to pass observational muster in its competition with the Big Bang cosmology. This episode 
again teaches us that empirically-based scientific theories are our sole epistemic avenue to the 
“’natural’ ” behavior of the universe at large, though of course only fallibly so.
 What then is the empirical cosmological verdict on the corollary of SoN which asserts 
that “It is natural for our universe not to exist, rather than to exist”? Apparently, there is no 
empirical evidence at all for this corollary from cosmology, let alone for SoN itself. Its proponents 
surely have not even tried to offer any such evidence for SoN, believing mistakenly, as we 
saw, that it can be vouchsafed a priori `a la Leibniz.
7.  PEQ as a failed springboard for creationist theism: The collapse of Leibniz’s and 
Swinburne’s theistic cosmological arguments
Probably every one of us from the Occident has wondered at some time in our lives: 
“Where did everything come from?” As we know, typically this question is not a demand 
for a statement of the earlier physical history of our existing universe. Instead, the question 
is driven by the largely unconscious assumption of SoN, and is thus simply another version 
of Leibniz’s query PEQ. Yet as I have argued painstakingly, PEQ rests on the ill-founded 
premise SoN, as well as on Leibniz’s very questionable PSR. Therefore, PEQ is an ill-
conceived non-starter, which poses a pseudo-issue based on quicksand.
 But, as we know, both Leibniz and Swinburne raised PEQ as an imperative question, 
and thence they concluded misguidedly that the answer to it mandates divine creation ex 
nihilo.
 However, PEQ evidently cannot serve as a viable springboard for creationist theism, 
because the demise of its premises PSR and SoN undermine it beyond redemption! 
By the same token, Leibniz’s and Swinburne’s cosmological arguments for divine creation are 
fundamentally unsuccessful.
 Hence I say to you: Whatever philosophical problems you have brought to this congress, 
it is my plea today that answering Leibniz’s PEQ should not engage your curiosity.
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8.  Coda on the failure to heed this plea
Two widely read atheistic authors, Richard Dawkins (2006, p. 155) and Sam Harris (2006, 
p. 73-74) have succumbed to the guiles of Leibniz’s PEQ by countenancing it misguidedly 
as a searching question that rightly calls for an explanatory answer. Thus, Dawkins allowed 
a “first cause, the great unknown which is responsible for something existing rather than 
nothing” (ibid.). And Harris capitulates to PEQ, declaring with very misplaced intellectual 
humility: “Any intellectually honest person will admit that he does not know why the 
universe exists. Scientists, of course, readily admit their ignorance on this point” [italics in 
original] (ibid. p. 74]. 
 But surely the failure to answer a pseudo-question does not bespeak ignorance on the 
part of scientists, philosophers or even the man in the street. Thus, Dawkins and Harris 
very misguidedly took PEQ as legitimate grounds for watering down their atheism.
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